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Provinces and Local Government Revenues Structures and
Intra-Province Economic Disparity
Riatu M. Qibthiyyaha,∗
a Department

Economic, Faculty Economics and Business, Universitas Indonesia

Abstract
One of major policies of Indonesia Decentralisation is the adoption on various type of revenue sharing among
provinces and local governments and also the devolved of taxes to lower level government in particular to
the province level. Challenges of policy toward higher degree of revenue autonomy, is that an increase in
revenue sharing as well as devolved taxes would enhance economic disparity among regions. Further, our
finding shows that different types of revenue sharing seem to have different effect on intra-province economic
disparity.
Keywords: decentralisation; provinces and local revenue; regional inequality

Abstrak
Salah satu kebijakan utama Desentralisasi Indonesia adalah pengambilan berbagai bagi hasil pendapatan
antar provinsi dan pemerintah daerah serta pelimpahan pajak kepada pemerintah tingkat bawah khususnya
ke tingkat provinsi. Tantangan kebijakan menuju otonomi pendapatan yang lebih tinggi, adalah bahwa
pelimpahan bagi hasil serta pelimpahan pajak akan meningkatkan kesenjangan ekonomi antar daerah. Hasil
temuan kami menunjukkan bahwa berbagai jenis bagi hasil tampaknya memiliki pengaruh yang berbeda
terhadap kesenjangan ekonomi antar-provinsi.
Kata kunci: desentralisasi; pendapatan provinsi dan daerah; ketimpangan daerah
JEL classifications: D63; H71

1. Introduction

case of handling economic disparity across region
in Indonesia.

Existing studies on intergovernmental transfers, and
in a more general context revenue structure, generally assessed of how the revenue structure may
mitigate fiscal disparity, either it refers to horizontal and or vertical fiscal disparity. An assessment
based on this objective to some extent is considered
to be less practical for the policymaker. Policymaker
may also want to know performance of these policies, i.e. on intergovernmental transfers, in relation
to a more general development objective, as in the
∗ Corresponding

Author: Institute for Economic and Social
Research (LPEM). Faculty of Economic and Busines, Universitas
Indonesia. Jl. Salemba Raya, No.4 jakarta 10430, Indonesia. Email: prcrmqx@gmail.com.

The revenue structure of lower level government,
can be differentiated based on type of revenue sharing – a block grant and conditional grant that is
based on certain formula of equalization, and revenue sharing that follows a derivation principle of
certain economic resources – which in this case
is revenue sharing on natural resources and taxes
sharing. Unlike block grants or equalization grants
which is perceived to reduce horizontal fiscal disparity across regions especially at the local level, revenue sharing and sub-national taxes on normative
ground is viewed to mitigate vertical fiscal disparity.
There may be a trade-off between reduction of ver-
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tical fiscal disparity and higher horizontal fiscal dis-

Philippines are an example of how higher revenue

parity across region, referring to inequity among

autonomy as well as more devolution on functional

provinces and or local governments. Inequity in

arrangement from central to sub-national govern-

fiscal, in the context of lower level governments,
nonetheless may and may not also lead to eco-

ments have associated with higher regional economic disparity (Song 2013, Jiang & Zhao 2012,

nomic disparity. Some of studies have explored

Silva 2005).

the effect of fiscal disparity, represented by government expenditures distributive policies on national
economic disparity (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill 2004,
Shankar & Shah 2003, Lessmann 2011, Saachi
& Salotti 2011). Rodriguez-Pose & Gill (2004) explored the correlation between reduction in fiscal
inequality caused by devolution and regional economic disparity, in which in some countries – there
are positive relationship between period of events of
more decentralization policies led to higher regional
economic disparities. By measure of expenditure
decentralization index, on also cross-countries unit
of analysis, found a negative relationship between
fiscal decentralization and regional economic disparity (Shankar & Shah 2003, Lessmann 2011).
However, the relationship between fiscal decentralization in the context of revenue autonomy on

This study aims to explore, in the context of country
specific analysis, of whether the presence of revenue sharing would actually exacerbate economic
inequality across region, a notion that hampered
the effort to devolving more revenues to provincial
and local governments. Existing literature on revenue sharing which include natural resource and
taxes mostly are assessed its impact on horizontal
economic disparity, solely at the national level and
not yet in specific to the provincial intra-economic
disparity. To our knowledge, there is not yet studies exploring on the effect of revenue structure on
economic disparity, especially when the measured
economic disparity also takes into account context
of multi-tier level of government of its sub-national
revenue structure (scheme).

regional economic disparity is less clear. Saachi
& Salotti (2001) conducted cross-country analysis
and shows that higher revenue autonomy lead to

2. Literature Review

higher regional economic disparity, however study
by Ezcurra & Pascual (2008) that is based on analysis on European Union countries, found of higher
revenue autonomy associate with lower regional

2.1. Inter and Intra – Province Economic Disparity

economic disparity.
Discussion on regional economic disparity mostly
Previous studies, which mostly based on compar-

focuses on economic disparity at the national, either

ative cross-country analysis, has shown of incon-

referring to economic disparity among provinces

clusive findings in support of whether improvement
in revenue autonomy may come at the costs of de-

(inter-province) or economic disparity among all local governments. Our study would like to explore, a

terioration of regional economic disparity. And at

somewhat similar but different perspective of eco-

country specific level, there is also still a debate

nomic disparity that is intra-province economic dis-

on the effect of distributive policies, from the type

parity. Given the decentralised system adopted in

of expenditure decentralization as well as on de-

Indonesia for the last decades, mitigating economic

gree of revenue autonomy on regional economic

disparity across regions on the national level may

disparity (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill 2004). China and

not only be the objective of central government.
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Even for the case of national level, is quite different

83

province disparity) in comparison of the national

depending on the level of lower level governments

level of economic disparity for local governments

regions that are analyzed. Economic development

(ND – national disparity). As intra-province (local

referring to indicator of per capita of Gross Regional
Domestic Product (per capita GRDP), based on a

governments) economic disparity tend to be better
than national (local governments) economic dispar-

measure of Gini coefficient as shown in Figure 1,

ity, in most of the provinces, an assessment of what

tend to be more unequal on the context of local

might be the determinants of this intra-province eco-

governments than for the case of provincial govern-

nomic disparity may also be important.

ments. The value of Gini coefficient of local governments per capita GRDP is much higher than Gini
coefficient of provinces per capita GRDP. Figure
1 also shows that despite a higher degree of disparity among local governments nationally, the degree of disparity tends to decline, however it is less
clear on whether inter-province disparity has improved. There is a spike of higher economic disparity among local governments for year 2009–2010,
though in overall there is a slightly decline trend
of economic disparity among local governments.
Meanwhile, economic disparity among provinces
tends to fluctuate but has been relatively constant
for the last five years.

Improvement in intra-province economic disparity, is
part of an effort than can be be viewed to mitigate inequality issue in general. Economic (development)
disparity among local governments within province,
refers to disparity in per capita gross domestic product among municipalities and cities in a province,
may reflect a concentrated economic development
that could reduce optimal efficiency of resources
allocation in a province. As applied to central government, mitigating an increase in economic disparity may also be one of lower level government
objectives at least for the case of province level of
governments.

For the case of Indonesia, there is an increase trend
in inequality among household income in Indonesia
(Ministry of Finance, 2014). A relatively gloomy picture on household economic income equality, may
also lead to another issue of whether there is also a
worsening condition on regional economic disparity.
Galbraith & Hale (2014) stated there is a close link
between regional economic disparity – measured
by per capita of national income or gross domestic
product - and region households’ income inequality.

2.2. Province and Local Government
Revenues Structures and Economic Disparity
In regard of fiscal decentralisation policies in Indonesia, one major characteristics of supporting
expenditure decentralisation are through intergovernmental transfers. As there are various type of
intergovernmental transfers, the distributive type

As shown in previous Figure 1, there is higher

of transfers are less supported on the context of

though a slightly decrease in trend of economic
disparity among local governments in period of

revenue sharing and also on the case of devolved
taxes to the provinces and local governments. The

2010–2012, however, the pattern of economic dis-

revenue sharing as well as devolved taxes are dis-

parity may likely be different among provinces.

tributed based on region in which revenues are

As shown in Figure 2, comparing economic de-

collected, and thus for the case that those type of

velopment among local governments within each

revenues are buoyant, higher revenues received by

province, very few provinces that exhibit higher lo-

more affluent (high income) provinces and or local

cal governments’ economic disparity (IPD – intra

governments. Translated to the context of economic
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Figure 1: Trend in Gini Coefficient of per Capita GRDP: Provinces and Local Governments
Source: Authors’ calculation

Figure 2: Number of Provinces with Lower or Higher Economic Disparity than to National Level
Note: IPD: Intra-Province Disparity, ND: National Disparity, and economic disparity is local governments per capita GRDP.
Source: Authors’ calculation
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disparity, the revenue sharing aims to mitigate ver-

or the tax base. The central government directly

tical (fiscal) disparity, may be viewed come with a

shared the revenues to province and local govern-

trade-off of exacerbating horizontal economic dis-

ments, which generally considered not only of the

parity.

producing region but also non-producing regions. In
the case of natural resource revenue sharing, the

The revenue sharing as well as provincial and or
local governments taxes, may also have impact on
horizontal economic disparity. These revenues type
link economic endowment or revenues bases, following a derivation principle. It is believed that an
unequal nature of economic development among
regions would be exacerbated by the presence of

producing region referred to the province if the resources are located in more than one municipality,
for example is revenue of central government from
forestry (logging); or it is located in the sea territory
of the province (3 mile up to 12 mile from the shore)
as in the case of oil production sharing.

the revenue sharing. In this context, this study aims

The natural resource revenue sharing allocation,

to explore the effect of these types of provincial and

applied to extractive sector production, consist of

local government revenues on local governments
economic disparity within each province, in an ef-

general mining activities (on minerals and coals)

fort to understand determinants of intra-province

tral government, forestry product (i.e. logging), oil,

economic disparity. Furthermore, as the beneficia-

gas, geothermal, as well as fisheries. In terms of

ries of revenue sharing are administration unit of

fisheries, the revenues do not come from produc-

lower level of government, which in this case are
provinces and local governments, the respective

tion but from boat license that are issued by central
government. The arrangement of natural resource

objective need to also be assessed in terms of ad-

revenues that are retained by central government,

ministrative unit (level of government).

is 20% of the total resource revenues, with an ex-

in which licenses or contract is managed by cen-

ception is on the revenue sharing of oil and gas
The structure of province and local government revenues consists of local revenue (PAD, called as own

production. For example, in the case of natural resource revenues from forestry and mining permits

source revenues), balancing funds, and other legit-

(landrent) and production royalty, the revenue that

imate revenue (other revenues). Balancing fund

will be retained by central government is 20%, as

comes from central government that consists of

80% of the revenues are allocated to the province

revenue sharing (DBH), general allocation funds

in which the natural resources production is located

(DAU) and specific allocation funds (DAK). The pur-

and local governments in that provinces.

poses of balancing funds in overall is to mitigate
vertical (fiscal) imbalance in terms of revenue between central and its lower level government as a
consequence of mismatch of devolved government
assignment between central and its lower level government.

Related to oil production, the revenues that are allocated between central government and provinces
and local governments based on production (lifting)
that is used as estimation of gross revenues. In
this case, the revenues has netted out the taxes
that is paid to central government as well as to

The revenue sharing (DBH) which consist of natural

province and or local governments. The allocation

resource revenue sharing and central government

of these revenues to regions – provinces and lo-

tax sharing. There is a different formula of shar-

cal governments – applied to area of production

ing allocation across each type of revenues and

that are considered as on-shore oil production. In

also depending on the coverage of the endowment

this case, on on-shore oil production revenues, the
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sharing arrangement of oil production (lifting) rev-

on CHT (Cukai Hasil Tembakau). To note, previ-

enues are 84.5% to central government, and 15.5%

ously there is also tax sharing on property transfer

to provinces and local governments. Meanwhile,

tax (BPHTB – Bea Pengalihan Hak atas Tanah dan

on central government revenues from gas production, the allocation of revenues retained by central

Bangunan), though as this tax is devolved to local
governments since 2011, it has ended as part of

government is 69.5%, thus province and local gov-

central government tax sharing in 2010.

ernment level receive 30.5% of the revenues from
gas sector collected by central government. From
pool of revenues to the producing’s province and
local governments within that province, local governments receive 80% of revenues allocation – which
is also distributed following a 50:50 rule between
producing local governments and non-producing
local governments in that province.

The central government allocates 90% of property
taxes revenues to provinces and local governments.
The sharing arrangement to provinces and local
governments is based on derivation (property taxes
collection) – 81%, and incentive - 9%. For the pool
of 81% of property tax revenues, the provinces receive 16.2% of the allocation, while local govern-

In this case, the sharing arrangement between

ments received 64.8% of the allocation. In this case,
the incentive of 9% is allocated in equal amount to

province and local governments are relatively simi-

all local governments (6.5%) and to local govern-

lar across type of natural resources revenues. The

ments that have revenues collection exceeded the

allocation between province and local government

target (3.5%).

follows 20:80 rule from pool allocated to lower level
of government. As discussed, the natural revenues

On the context of individual income tax and payroll

allocation to local governments refer to both the

tax, the central government shares 20% of these

producing local governments and non-producing

taxes revenues to provinces and local governments.

local governments in that province. The allocation

The sharing arrangement between provinces and lo-

to non-producing local governments are equally distributed. The share of this equal sharing is not small,

cal governments are 8% for the provinces, and 12%
of the taxes revenues are for local governments. In

in relative to numbers of local governments typically

this case, the distribution to local governments is

existed in the provinces endowed with high natu-

based on taxpayers’ registration – referring if it is

ral resources. The equal share of natural resource

payroll taxes, then it generally will be where firms

revenues sharing allocated to local governments

are located, and about 3.6% of the revenues will be

generally followed a 50:50 rule between producing

allocated equally to all local governments in respec-

local governments and non-producing local govern-

tive province.

ments.

Other than property taxes and individual (and pay-

The central government also shares some of its

roll) taxes, central government also shared cigarette

taxes revenues to province and local governments.
The property taxes, prior devolution of the tax in

excise revenues to provinces and local governments. As Law No. 28 2009 stipulate on part of

effective 2014, is the type of tax in which most of

excise cigarette that is considered as provincial tax,

its revenues are allocated to provinces and local

which can be levied by the producing region (uni-

governments. The central government also shares

formly), the central government keep part of the

revenues from individual income tax and payroll tax

revenues other than "the piggyback" part, to be al-

to province and local governments, as well as ex-

located as well to local governments. The cigarette

cise tax from cigarette – called as revenue sharing

excise tax is central government excise levied to
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cigarette production, and 2% of this excise tax rev-

line consumption (PBBKB – Pajak Bahan Bakar

enue is allocated to local governments based on

Kendaraan Bermotor), tax on surface water, and

certain criteria.

the cigarette tax. The vehicle related taxes are dom-

To note, revenue sharing (DBH) is not a dominant

inant revenue source and also withholding taxes.
It is the central government agency – which is

type of revenues in comparison to equalization
grants (DAU). This equalizaton grant, called as General Allocation Fund, contributed to almost 60% to
overall central government transfers (Ministry of
Finance 2017). In this case, the taxes revenue sharing also tend to exceed natural resource revenue

the Police – that administered and collected these
province taxes. Similar to the vehicles related tax,
the province cigarette tax is also administered and
collected by central government – the Directorate
of Custom, Ministry of Finance.

sharing, especially as extractive sector seems to

Figure 4 shows that own source revenue (PAD) dur-

be more fluctuated in terms of production as it also

ing 2010–2012. As a part of PAD, the role of local

links to regulatory dynamic in the sector.

taxes is very high in all government level. The con-

Figure 3 shows the share of government transfer

tribution of local taxes to PAD in province level are
more than 80%, while in municipality (kabupaten)

to local government revenue is very high. During
2010–2012, the average transfer to city and municipality are more than 80% of their local revenue. In

and city level (kota), local taxes revenues on average are 55% and 34% respectively.

city (kota) and municipality (kabupaten), the trans-

In regard to province and local government taxes

fers from central government are higher than in

(local tax in PAD), the sharing arrangement only ap-

province level. For the province level, the share is

plied for province taxes and not local governments

more than 44% each year during 2010–2012. In

taxes. A similar approach as with intergovernmental

comparison to other sources of revenue that is own

transfer that is allocated from higher level govern-

source revenues (PAD), their share is almost the
same. In 2012, government transfers are 51.09% of

ment, the sharing arrangement of taxes revenues
only available from the province to local govern-

local government revenue. It increases 13.8% from

ments and not vice versa. Province may receive

2010 where the transfers are only 44%. In 2010–

or collect taxes and then determine the period and

2012, the role of own source revenues (PAD) in

disbursement (allocation) formula of these taxes to

province level are quite high rather than in city and

local governments.

municipality level. The smallest contributions are in
district level. In province level average contribution
of PAD to total revenue are more than 47%, while
in district and municipality the share is only 5.5%
and 16.2%.

On vehicle related taxes, the province shared to
local governments within that province 30% of
province tax revenues, in which each province may
have different formula on the allocation of these

From total of 16 types of province and local gov-

province taxes. Meanwhile, on surface water tax,
the sharing arrangement between province and its

ernment taxes, only 5 types of taxes are assigned

local government follows a 50:50 rule on the base of

to provincial level of government. These taxes are

surface water that located in more than one munici-

the annual vehicle taxes (PKB – Pajak Kendaraan

pality, but the province will only retain tax revenues

Bermotor), the vehicle transfer tax which is a tax

of 20% if the surface water is located specific in

based on transaction or sales of vehicles (BBNKB –

one municipality. Given this arrangement that is

Bea Balik Nama Kendaraan Bermotor), tax on gaso-

considered to be low for provincial government, in
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Figure 3: The Structure of Local Government Revenue 2010–2012
Source: Authors’ calculation

Figure 4: The Structure of Own Source Revenue (PAD)
Source: Authors’ calculation

Economics and Finance in Indonesia Vol. 63 No. 1, June 2017

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/efi/vol63/iss1/5
DOI: 10.47291/efi.v63i1.569

8

Qibthiyyah: Provinces and Local Government Revenues Structures and Intra-Prov

Q IBTHIYYAH , R. M./P ROVINCES

AND

L OCAL G OVERNMENT R EVENUES S TRUCTURES ...

89

addition to unclear value of surface water, to some

in regional economic disparity. A decrease of re-

extent – there are provinces that are not collected

gional economic disparity from devolution of fiscal

this type of tax (Suratman et al. 2013). As in the

power, can occur as low income local governments,

case of cigarette tax, only 30% of revenues is retained by province. Around 70% of the revenues

can still catch up in delivering standardized public
services due to support from central government

from cigarette tax is allocated to local governments

through intergovernmental transfers. Poor regions

in which 10% of it is equally shared among local

(province or local government) that are able to im-

1

governments within that province.

Other prospective source of PAD are user fee and
other legitimate PAD. The major contribution of user
fee are high in city level rather than in municipality
level. during 2010 until 2013 the average revenue
from user fee are 22% in city and 13.5% in municipality. The share of other own revenues in province
are quite small but it is quite high in city/municipality.
The average of other revenues in PAD during 2010–
2013 are 7.5% in province while in district are more
than 27% and municipality 18.7%.
As economic disparity may initially present in a particular province due to the initial variation of natural
resources and geographic condition among its municipalities and cities (List & Gallet 1999, Knight
& Song 2003), it can also be influenced by government revenues and expenditures structures of
province or local governments (Shankar & Shah
2003). However, as discussed, there are not yet literatures explaining the effect of revenues structure
on economic disparity, albeit there is a quite large
of literature that explore the effect of government

prove and provide standardized of quality public services may attract higher resources that will enhance
economic development in those regions. In contrast,
higher devolution can also increase regional economic disparity, assuming that more efficient and
rich provinces (and or local governments) are able
to provide a higher quality of public services and
thus may attract more residents that translated to
more resources attracted to those provinces and or
local governments, leaving other lagging provinces
and or local governments experiencing higher gap
in economic development.
Economic disparity among provinces or local governments to some extent may also be resulted from
the provinces or local governments comparative
characteristics, for example the presence of unequal natural resources distribution that are generally unevenly distributed, the variety in geographic
conditions, and the dynamic of population distribution (Ross et al. 2012, Song 2013). Provinces
or local governments with abundance natural resources, would be benefited from high though unstable stream of revenues than other provinces.

revenues structures on economic growth (Mofidi &
Stone 1990, Wildmalm 2001) as well as on the re-

In the case of Indonesia, existing studies generally

lationship between economic growth and economic

choose pre-determined a type of transfer that is

disparity (Lessman 2011).

viewed will mostly affect economic disparity. Swast-

There is a competing theory on how higher de-

yardi (2008) explores the dominant type of the transfers, General Allocation Fund, on region economic

volution, on expenditures as well as revenues,

disparity (Swastyardi 2008). In contrast to General

may resulted on either a decrease or an increase

Allocation Fund (DAU), the revenue sharing is not
an instrument to reduce economic disparity, though

1 To

note, cigarette tax as it is administered by central government, the additional rate of the excise (on central government
cigarette excise) can also be allocated to the producing region –
referring to provinces in which the cigarette factories located.

as noted in previous section, we cannot rule the
likely impact of revenue sharing to intra-province
economic disparity. Swastyardi (2008) views that
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General Allocation Fund has a different impact on

distributive policies related to mitigating economic

economic disparity in Indonesia. An increase in

disparity among jurisdictions would be relevant if

DAU would lower economic disparity at national

it is discussed at the provincial level rather than at

level, specifically on the region of Sumatera, Java,
and Bali, but DAU tend to instead increase eco-

municipalities or cities level. This is given the function among level of governments that can channel

nomic disparity in region of Kalimantan and Su-

directly to beneficiaries such as households as well

lawesi.

as to jurisdictions, but in the case of province, it can

To sum, on the determinants of intra-province disparity, components of revenues type either at the
provincial level or local level may play role as explained in the previous section. On framework of
revenues type and economic disparity that come
from derivation based as in the case of revenue

only function through planning and making distributive policies solely in the context of empowering
respective local governments through grants from
the provincial level, as specific programs such as
social assistance may not be considered as provincial function.

sharing (DBH) and own source revenues (OSR),

The period of estimation is between 2010 and up

which is believed to be highly unevenly dispersed

to 2012, as in this period an issuance of province

among regions, these revenues may be viewed to

and local taxes and charges – Law No. 28 2009,

increase economic disparity.

more on province taxes and the sharing arrangement, but not yet on the devolved local government

3. Empirical Model

taxes (property taxes). The Law stipulated that in
the case of province taxes – some percentage of tax
revenues will also be shared to local governments.
The Government also implemented a wider base

As discussed, previous studies mostly focused on

of revenue sharing especially in the form tax shar-

cross-country analysis, and those studies may not

ing. In this period, the devolved of property taxes,

be adequate, as fiscal decentralization policy, may

referring to urban and rural property tax, is not yet

not be defined uniformly across countries – not only

in effect. The adoption of rural and urban property

on the context of expenditure devolution but also

tax by most of local governments is in year 2014.

on the degree of revenue autonomy (Shankar &
Shah 2003, Saachi & Salotti 2011). An assessment
on country specific, may complement existing studies – especially in exploring the effect of derivationbased revenue sharing as whether it will deteriorate
regional economic disparity, as mostly presumed.
Furthermore, the estimation model would also explore of whether equalization revenue sharing as
in the case of General Allocation Fund (DAU) may
have effect on regional economic disparity.

On indicator of intra-province economics disparity,
we use indicator of economic disparity represented
by Gini coefficient of per capita Gross Regional
Domestic Product (per capita GRDP), that has a
value between 0 to 1. Zero value of Gini coefficient represent a perfectly equal distribution of per
capital GRDP which means that all local governments in that province have the same value of per
capita GRDP, while value 1 of Gini coefficient reflect
economic value added (GRDP) in that respective

This study focuses on the estimation at the province

province concentrated only in one local government.

level. The estimation on the province level may

The measured variable of economic disparity is in-

shed light on the determinants of intra-province

come indicator of per capita GRDP that is also used

economic disparity. On the context of Indonesia,

in Shankar & Shah (2003). A Gini coefficient is not
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the only indicator that can be used to measure dis-

which in this case is part on the overall province

parity, as we can also use coefficient of variation

own source revenues.

(CV), and or any other type of indicators. However,
the values are generally not much different across
these indicators (Shankar & Shah 2003). Rationally
of using Gini coefficient, is usually also based on

4. Results and Analysis

that this indicator can be linked to Lorenz Curve
and thus is more interpretative than other inequality
or disparity indicator measurement.

The empirical results show that revenue sharing
received by the provinces and local governments
affect differently to intra-province economic dispar-

Given the type of dependent variable, which has

ity. Table 1 shows results from three model esti-

range of value between 0 and 1, the estimation is

mations to incorporate general model (model 1),

based on Tobit panel regression, as shown in the

disaggregation of revenue sharing (model 2), and

following estimation model:
Yit = α0 +

X

αk Xkt + εit + vi

spatial differences (model 3). As shown in Table
(1)

k

1 in estimation model 1, higher revenue sharing
to local governments, in aggregate, tends to associate with higher intra-province economic disparity.

where Y : intra-province economic disparity; X :

The revenue sharing to local governments in this

explanatory variables (set of social and economic

model estimation is the sum of natural resource

characteristic indicators, set of variables on provin-

revenue sharing and central government taxes that

cial as well as local government revenues that are

are shared to local governments.

linked to derivation-based type of revenues); and
From estimation result shown in model 2 and model

εit : random error term.

3 (Table 1), given that local governments revenue

The explanatory variables consist of province

sharing is disaggregated into tax sharing and natu-

GRDP, province population, share of provincial as

ral resource sharing, the results show that tax shar-

well as local government revenues that are linked to

ing to local government consistently associates with

derivation based (revenue sharing and own source

higher intra-province economic disparity, but there

revenues), and region specific characteristics.

is unclear evidence that natural resources sharing

The revenues structure variables, are revenue sharing, general allocation fund (province) and own
source revenues. The separation on type of revenue sharing into tax sharing and natural resource
sharing is applied to revenues sharing received by
the province, as well as local governments. To note,
variable of local government revenues refers to local

to local government also exacerbates intra-province
economic disparity. However, after controlling for
region specific, as shown in estimation model 3
in Table 1, both local governments taxes revenue
sharing and local government natural resources revenue sharing significantly increase intra-province
economic disparity.

government revenues on specific type of revenues

To note, there is less clear differences on the base

aggregated to the province level. The revenue shar-

(of economic activity) in terms of revenue sharing to

ing that are received by local governments, only

local governments that come from natural resource

include revenue sharing from central government

revenues and taxes revenues – especially between

taxes and natural resource sharing. The local gov-

natural resource sharing and central government

ernments, also received sharing of province taxes,

property tax sharing. In the context of central gov-
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ernment tax sharing, tax sharing on property taxes,

population in these region, in comparison to Java

around 90% of tax revenue is distributed back to

provinces. As shown in Table 1, the estimation

local governments. The property taxes consist of

model has controlled population, which in this case

the tax on urban and rural land and building, as
well as taxes related to natural resource activity –

have a positive effect to intra-province economic
disparity. Provinces with higher population, refer-

property tax on mining, plantation, and oil and gas.

ring to provinces in Java island, tend to have higher

For the property in these three sectors, the struc-

intra-province economic disparity.

ture in terms of the rate and the base in which the
tax is levied to some extent link to natural resource
activity, as it is also levied to production value.

5. Conclusion

Meanwhile, for the case of provincial revenue sharing, estimation results in Table 1 show there is no

The distributive policy is generally reviewed in the

evidence that provincial revenue sharing tend to

context of national, and rarely it is reviewed the dis-

increase intra-province inequality. As shown model
2 and model 3 in Table 1, even after disaggregat-

tributive policy based on provincial level, referring

ing type of revenue sharing and controlling for re-

effort of distributive policies on decentralization that

gion specific, provincial revenue tax sharing as well

focusing on level of local government is applied

provincial natural resources sharing do not affect

on the case of general allocation fund. The gen-

intra-province economic disparity.

eral allocation fund (DAU), is aimed to ascertain

Instead, we found the different impact on the effect
of own source revenues on intra-province economic
disparity. Province with high provincial own source
revenues seems to also have low intra-province economic disparity, and vice versa. However, there is a
positive effect from local governments own source

to intra-province disparity. The current government

a minimum of fiscal disparity among local governments. However, it is less clear of the distributive
impact from revenue sharing as in the case of natural resource and tax sharing that will mostly follow
a derivation-based principle, and at the extreme is
the devolved tax (i.e. own source revenues).

revenues on intra-province economic disparity. This

Meanwhile, reversing the course of decentralization

result of positive effect of local governments own

policies in Indonesia from a dominant expenditures’

source revenues is somewhat in line with the results

decentralization to a more balance revenues share

that also show the positive effect of local govern-

across level of government tends to be challeng-

ments taxes sharing on intra-province economic

ing, as quite many cross-country studies show that

disparity, as shown in model 2 and model 3 in Table

higher revenue decentralisation would have impact

1.

on higher economic disparity (Sacchi and Salotti

In regard to region specific, the estimation result in
model 3 Table 1 shows that provinces in Kalimantan,

2011).
Our study shows that there is no evidence on the

Sulawesi, and Sumatera have lower intra-province

case of Indonesia government transfers in the form

economic disparity relative to other regions. How-

of General Allocation Fund would actually influence

ever, we have not found a similar evidence for the

regional inequality referring to intra-province eco-

case of provinces in Java regions. Relatively lower

nomic disparity. The effect of revenue sharing on

intra-province economic disparity in non-Java is-

intra-province economic disparity has not also been

land provinces may not associate to a dispersed

conclusive. Despite to a popular belief that revenue
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Table 1: Estimation Results on Intra- Province Economic Disparity (Gini Coefficient)
Model 1
Model 2
PDRB
+
NS
+
NS
Population
+ ***
+
***
Province General Allocation Fund
+ NS
+ NS
Local Governments Revenue Sharing
+ ***
Province Revenue Sharing
+ NS
Province Tax Sharing
- NS
Province Natural Resources Sharing
+ NS
Local Governments Tax Sharing
+ ***
Local Governments Natural Resources Sharing
+ NS
Province Own Source Revenues
- **
- **
Local Governments Own Source Revenues
+ NS
+ NS
Region Specific: Kalimantan
Region Specific: Sumatera
Region Specific: Jawa dan Bali
Region Specific: Sulawesi
Constant
+ ***
+
***
Note: ***:1% significance, ** 5% significance, *10%, NS: not significant.
The coefficient estimates are shown in Appendix

sharing as well as own source revenue may actually increase intra-province economic disparity, our
study shows that at least for the case of provincial

[5]

level, there is no evidence that these derivationbased revenues may increase intra-province dis-

[6]

parity. Instead, on the case of province own-source
revenue, our study finds that higher own source

[7]

revenues may to some extent associate with lower
intra-province disparity. Moving forward, the findings in our study imply that to some extent may
also imply that a shift of more revenue decentrali-

[8]
[9]

sation to the provincial level may not always create
a trade-off of creating more regional (economic)
[10]

disparity.

[11]
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Appendix

Figure A1: Descriptive Statistics

Figure A2: Model 1
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Figure A3: Model 2

Figure A4: Model 3
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